What is an IDN?
An IDN (Internationalized Domain Name) is a domain name that contains characters outside the traditional ASCII set used in the original DNS specification. IDNs enable domain names in native scripts like Chinese (中文.com), Arabic (مثال.com), Cyrillic (пример.com), and many others.
Why IDNs Matter
The original DNS was designed for English speakers, limiting domain names to:
- Letters a-z (case insensitive)
- Numbers 0-9
- Hyphens (not at start or end)
This excluded billions of people whose languages don't use the Latin alphabet. IDNs democratize the internet by enabling:
- Native Language Addresses: Users can type URLs in their own language
- Brand Protection: Companies can secure their names in multiple scripts
- Cultural Accessibility: Reduces the barrier to internet participation
How IDNs Work: The Punycode Connection
DNS infrastructure only understands ASCII, so IDNs use a clever encoding system called Punycode. When you register or access an IDN:
1. User Types: 中文.com (Chinese for "Chinese")
2. Browser Encodes: xn--fiq228c.com (Punycode representation)
3. DNS Resolves: Standard ASCII lookup
4. Browser Displays: 中文.com (original form)
The "xn--" prefix indicates a Punycode-encoded string. This happens transparently to users.
Punycode Examples
| IDN | Punycode |
|---|---|
| münchen.de | xn--mnchen-3ya.de |
| 中文.com | xn--fiq228c.com |
| правда.рф | xn--80aafi6cg.xn--p1ai |
IDN Support Across TLDs
IDN support varies by TLD:
Full Support
Most modern gTLDs and many ccTLDs support IDNs:
- .com, .net, .org (Verisign)
- .de (German characters)
- .jp (Japanese)
- .cn (Chinese)
Internationalized TLDs
Some TLDs are themselves IDNs:
- .рф (Russia, Cyrillic)
- .中国 (China)
- .भारत (India, Devanagari)
- .السعودية (Saudi Arabia, Arabic)
Limited or No Support
Some TLDs restrict IDNs or don't support them at all. Always verify IDN support for your target TLD.
Security Considerations: Homograph Attacks
IDNs introduce security risks through homograph attacks, where visually similar characters from different scripts create deceptive domains:
apple.com (legitimate - Latin letters)
аpple.com (attack - Cyrillic 'а' looks like Latin 'a')
Protections Against Homograph Attacks
Browser Behavior: Modern browsers display Punycode for suspicious IDNs instead of the Unicode form, revealing the attack. Registry Policies: Some registries restrict which character sets can be combined in a single domain. Domain Monitoring: Tools like DomScan's typosquatting detection can identify registered homograph variants of your brand.Implementing IDN Support
For developers building domain tools:
Validation
// Check if domain contains non-ASCII
function isIDN(domain) {
return /[^\x00-\x7F]/.test(domain);
}
Conversion
// Convert to Punycode for DNS queries
const punycode = require('punycode/');
const ascii = punycode.toASCII('中文.com'); // xn--fiq228c.com
const unicode = punycode.toUnicode('xn--fiq228c.com'); // 中文.com
RDAP Queries
Most RDAP servers accept both forms:
# Both work
curl "https://rdap.verisign.com/com/v1/domain/xn--fiq228c.com"
curl "https://rdap.verisign.com/com/v1/domain/中文.com"
Best Practices
When working with IDNs:
1. Always store and process the Punycode form internally
2. Display the Unicode form to users
3. Implement homograph detection for security features
4. Verify TLD-specific IDN policies before registration